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ABSTRACT
COVERAGE OF THE EURO CRISIS IN SPANISH, GERMAN, BRITISH, AND
AMERICAN ELITE NEWSPAPERS
by
Katrina Schwarz
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014
Under the Supervision of Professor David Pritchard

This study examined the relationships among culture, economic policy, and news content
in the European economic context. The three variables can affect one another, and the
effects of information and policy can influence the future of the European Union. The
culture measure included opinion and government support in the news. The economic
policy measure included austerity and bailout stances. Content analysis of news content
from significant periods in 2011 and 2012 in elite Spanish, German, British and
American news revealed differences in news coverage. The sample included 646 articles.
Spanish and German news had the most coverage of the euro crisis because the events of
the crisis affected Spain and Germany more than they affected Britain and the United
States. The results indicated that national economic policy influenced newspaper
coverage of the euro crisis to an extent. However, the culture measures did not explain
the observed differences in content, showing that attitudes of journalists toward the
government in a specific news culture may not always affect content.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Even though the economy affects everyone, it is often through information
outside of personal experience that people make sense of the big picture. News often fills
this role, even for policy makers, which means news can have some effect on economic
policy. The news can also reflect national culture, which also influences policy.
Differences in policy and information in different countries can make it harder for
countries to work together, which in the case of the European Union could determine
whether the Union will still be around in the future or have to break up because of too
many differences getting in the way of unified action. To address this issue, this thesis
shows the connections among culture, news, and policy through a content analysis and
comparison of German, Spanish, British, and American elite newspaper coverage of the
euro crisis during significant weeks in 2011 and 2012.
While the web of influence just outlined can have consequences within an
individual country in the global system, it can have another set of consequences when
countries’ economies are institutionally connected through common policy and currency,
as is the case in the European Union. Differences in national interests of the individual
member states, interests that economic policies and news coverage reflect, have had
consequences in the handling of treaties and have threatened the Union itself.1 The states
maintain a degree of sovereignty. Nevertheless, they are still obligated to adhere to the
economic and political treaties of the EU, although critics have said the lack of cohesive
political action in the EU has had negative effects. Part of this lack of cohesion could
stem from fear of Germany following World War II because the country has become the
1

See Carlo Bastasin, Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro (Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
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largest economy in Europe. A larger economy means Germany has more influence than
others in making economic decisions for the European Union, as described later in this
thesis. Too much real and perceived economic influence could renew fears that Germany
is trying to take over Europe again, only this time through economic control rather than
military power and invasion.
Even so, academics have found other causes for lack of unity in the European
Union as well. Referring to lack of unity, German scholar Jürgen Habermas said, “[t]he
financial, debt, and euro crises occurring in rapid succession have revealed the flaw in the
construction of a gigantic economic and currency area which lacks the necessary
instruments to conduct a joint economic policy.”2 Lack of unity in national interests and
policies, in many ways reflected and maintained by news coverage, has the potential to
have economic effects because of how the EU works. It would be challenging to measure
the direct effects of news coverage on economic policy because of all the variables that
go into creating policy. Rather than measuring effects, this thesis will connect news
coverage to economic policy and national culture by examining differences, if any,
among German, Spanish, British, and American coverage of the euro crisis. Variables to
measure policy and culture were defined and then coded for in news coverage to make
the connections and draw conclusions about why the content was the way it was and what
it could mean for Europe. By studying the content of news, scholars can understand the
decisions in the production of the content and the possible implications of the content on

2

Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Malden, MA: Polity Press,
2012), 129.
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the outside world.3 Such understandings allow researchers to make connections among
concepts without measuring direct effects.
Because of connections among culture, economic policy, and news, there can be
differences in news coverage when there are differences in culture and economic
position. Germany, the biggest economy in the European Union, has played the role of
the lender to weaker Eurozone countries in the past years. Other countries perceive
Germany as trying to lead all of Europe. Spain’s economy has not been doing as well
and has needed outside help, putting it at the mercy of stronger countries. Britain is part
of the European Union, but the euro crisis has affected the country differently because it
does not use the euro. Despite not using the euro, the country still has some investment
in EU policies. Britain has treated its membership to the EU as a free trade area rather
than full union.4 Euroscepticism, which is criticism of the European Union and
opposition to European integration, is also common within the British press.5 The United
States would feel mostly global effects of the crisis in Europe and has little influence over
what happens there compared to the other countries in this thesis. The differing positions
in the crisis combined with events within the crisis have caused resentment between the
countries receiving aid and the countries giving aid, at least among the public.6 These
differences in position plus differences in national culture could give rise to differences in
coverage, which would show a connection to differences in national sentiments and
actions surrounding the crisis despite the unity of the EU.
3

Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese, Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass
Media Content (White Plains, NY: Longman Publishers USA, 1996), 27-8.
4
P.W. Preston, England after the Great Recession: Tracking the Political and Cultural Consequences of
the Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 12.
5
Mick Temple, The British Press (Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, 2008), 194.
6
Thomas Mayer, Europe’s Unfinished Currency: The Political Economics of the Euro (New York: Anthem
Press, 2012), 180.
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Although academics studying the euro crisis have looked at the economic and
political causes and implications, they say little about news coverage of the crisis and its
possible implications. Because news coverage can reflect political and economic culture
and have an effect on the nation’s perceptions of politics and economics, it is useful to
have a comparison of euro crisis news to supplement the work about political and
economic differences. The international political and economic implications of the crisis
make a comparison of news even more useful. This thesis fills part of this gap in the
existing research through comparison of elite newspaper coverage during times of
significant developments with the euro. The field needs an understanding of content
across different countries,7 and this thesis helps fill that need. The findings of this thesis
are based on the content analysis of 646 articles. The results show not only implications
for the future of the EU, but also implications for this field of study. Differences in
coverage can say something about the unity of the European Union. The results could
also determine whether the common assumption that journalists’ attitudes affect content
holds true in this context.

7

Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, “Comparing Media Systems: A Response to Critics,” in Handbook
of Comparative Communication Research, eds. Frank Esser and Thomas Hanitzsch (London: Routledge,
2012), 218.
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Chapter 2: Crisis Background and Problems with Unity
What the euro crisis is should be clear before exploring the background of the
euro crisis. For the purpose of this thesis, the euro crisis is the economic hardship
following the sovereign debt, banking, and fiscal crises in the Eurozone countries, which
first started to reveal themselves during the 2007-2010 global financial crisis.8 The term
as I use it includes any economic action taken within the Eurozone to address any
economic issues related to the crisis, like unemployment or interest rates. The
interconnection among countries in the European Union makes concerns over the euro
and national economic concerns very much related. Because of the interconnection
among countries, euro crisis coverage also includes stories about just one Eurozone
country’s economy.
Imbalances in the System
The euro seemed promising when it came into use in 1999.9 The currency aided
growth in Greece, Ireland, and Spain while developing a reputation of low inflation and
low interest rates.10 However, the global financial crisis changed all that. In Europe, the
crisis intensified existing imbalances. Movement of currency has become increasingly
uneven because of trade imbalances. Scholars note this movement as a source of
imbalance because euros can travel across borders in the Eurozone more easily than
currencies valid in only one nation can travel across borders. While trade imbalances are
common in the global economy, the relatively easy movement of currency between

8

Patrick O’Callaghan, “Collective Memory in Law and Policy: The Problem of the Sovereign Debt Crisis.”
Legal Studies 32 (December 2012): 643.
9
Dermot Hodson, Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011), 31.
10
Bastasin, Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro, 90.
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countries within the common currency area have furthered imbalances in the European
system.11
National economic actions contributed to these imbalances. Part of what led to
the uneven buildup of debt was that some member states were not following the EU
budget rules.12 Even Germany, the country that pushed for stringent rules, was running a
deficit above the maximum limit, which made other countries less inclined to control
their own deficits.13 Attempts to rescue banks turned private debts into public ones in
some countries, leading to an uneven buildup of national debt.14
Banks furthered the imbalance by spooking easily. When the European Central
Bank stopped buying bonds financing Greek and Portuguese national debt to reduce risk,
other banks sold off bonds from similar countries, like Italy and Spain, also to reduce
risk, which spread the economic downturn to the other countries because the money flow
slowed.15 Such a situation shows how single risks affect the whole system in an
interdependent system like the EU in that banks considered Spain and Italy as risky even
though they were in a better situation than Greece.16 The resulting downgrades in certain
countries’ credit ratings created further imbalances in the Eurozone.17
The economic imbalances in the euro crisis are not new. An inflationary situation
similar to the euro crisis played out in the early 1990s as Europe was preparing for the
common currency and a full economic and monetary union. The countries affected by

11

Bastasin, Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro, 93.
Ibid., 78.
13
Ibid., 78.
14
O’Callaghan, “Collective Memory in Law and Policy,” 644.
15
Bastasin, Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro, 269.
16
Ibid., 313-4.
17
Ibid., 95.
12

7

the inflation were Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.18 France and Germany also had
higher deficits than usual during this time, which caused other countries to put less effort
into reducing their government deficits.19
Austerity Measures and Founding National Interests
Austerity measures and national policy preferences that influenced the founding
treaties also caused imbalances in the Eurozone economies. In light of the economic
conditions around 2010, the European Union leaned toward adopting austerity standards
much like the ones already in place in Germany.20 However, some scholars have pointed
out that such action would fix only problems caused by overspending and not those
caused by other factors.21 Even the countries in this study have had economic difficulties
for different reasons. Germany relied on exports and ran a surplus that companies
invested abroad, leading to reliance on other countries’ economies, while Britain had a
strong financial sector that led to riskier bank actions. Spain tried to catch up to the rest
of the EU while ignoring credit bubbles.22 Because of the different causes of economic
slowdown, austerity would affect each country differently.
The treaties that built the European Union favored some members’ national
interests over others. These founding treaties, which European leaders created and signed
over several decades, maintain a degree of economic and political unity by restraining
members of the community from acting too independently.23 However, that does not
mean members of the community had equal say in the treaties. The European Monetary
18

Malcolm Townsend, The Euro & Economic and Monetary Union (London: John Harper Publishing,
2007), 85.
19
Ibid., 85.
20
O’Callaghan, “Collective Memory in Law and Policy,” 645.
21
Robert Boyer, “The Four Fallacies of Contemporary Austerity Policies: The Lost Keynesian Legacy,”
Cambridge Journal of Economics 36 (2012): 301.
22
Bastasin, Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro, 80.
23
Townsend, The Euro & Economic and Monetary Union, 2.
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Union’s institutional design predominantly considered German interests because
Germany had the largest population and the most to lose. The German influence is why
anti-inflationary policies, conditions to encourage stability of the euro, limits on
government borrowing, and prohibition of financing member state debts became part of
the treaty.24 Germany was also behind the no bailout clause in the Maastricht Treaty,25
which explains the country’s reluctance to help failing neighbors within the Union during
the euro crisis. However, there have been ways to bypass the no bailout rule. A Regional
Fund has been in place to help new members catch up to the community.26 The treaty did
not rule out fiscal assistance to countries outside the euro area, an exception some leaders
have argued should allow for bailouts of countries within the Eurozone.27
As noted earlier, a lack of unity in actions and policies has caused economic
imbalances in the EU. Politicians and populations of the member states have not adjusted
to unity. National issues are still more important than European ones in elections within
the member states, which is why unity difficulties intensified.28 A study of news
coverage of European issues in Danish, Dutch, and British news in the first years of the
euro showed the lack of unity in news content. Coverage of Europe was a focus only
when a European event happened, like a political summit or a European parliamentary
election, but was almost nonexistent before or after the event.29 Even when there was

24

Hodson, Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad, 6.
Ibid., 7.
26
Townsend, The Euro & Economic and Monetary Union, 13.
27
Bastasin, Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro, 96.
28
Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, 134.
29
Claes H. de Vreese, “ ‘Europe’ in the News: A Cross-National Comparative Study of the News Coverage
of Key EU Events,” European Union Politics 2 (2001), 283.
25
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coverage of the European Union, national spin and interests influenced how news sources
covered the European Union.30
National Differences in Crisis Management: Germany, Spain, Britain, and the USA
Policy can counter times of economic hardship. Policies can encourage a
government deficit to combat recession or slow economic growth by reducing the
deficit.31 It is in making these decisions that differences appeared among the countries
researched in this thesis. Britain and Germany have two of the biggest economies in the
European Union. What has affected unity in the EU is that these two countries do not
agree on policy, which makes having a common strategy difficult.32 The monetary
policies of the European Union lean toward German austerity preferences because of the
performance of the mark before the introduction of the euro; however, other countries are
skeptical.33 Much of Europe has been critical of German ability to lead Europe. Much of
the criticism has stemmed from German concerns that ailing countries would default on
German loans. The German government has tried to avoid losing money loaned to other
countries by adding strict austerity conditions, which has led to political disagreements
and German resistance to offering economic help to other countries.34
One example of national differences arose when some leaders suggested the idea
of fiscal stimulus as a solution for Greece in 2010. Britain called for a fiscal stimulus in
Greece while Germany refused.35 The United States also advocated a stimulus in
Europe.36 Germany’s reluctance to do a fiscal stimulus was not in keeping with its strong
30

De Vreese, “‘Europe’ in the News,” 300.
Townsend, The Euro & Economic and Monetary Union, 24.
32
Bastasin, Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro, 75.
33
Ibid., 75.
34
Ibid., 279.
35
Ibid., 76.
36
Ibid., 77.
31
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economic profile because other countries with strong economies were more apt to use a
stimulus for recovery.37 Demographic changes within the country could explain part of
the German reluctance. Germany’s population is aging. Not enough young people are
working in the country to keep the social welfare system afloat. One response to the
economic hardship has been for the Germans to increase spending on education but cut
wherever possible elsewhere to ensure they have high-earning workers paying into the
social welfare system in the future to prevent collapse.38 Higher-earning workers would
offset the decrease in the number of workers. Growth in population is likely to happen
only with an increase in immigration, which is not popular because immigration
integration has not worked as expected.39 Even generations later, descendants of guest
workers have had troubles becoming part of German society. The Germans were also
nervous about a repeat of the Transferunion, which is the evening out of economic
disparities between the eastern and western German states since the reunification of East
and West Germany in 1990, but on a European scale and without a fixed timetable.40
Germany would have to give more financial aid than other countries.41
Although Spain has gotten some attention in the news because of bad economic
conditions and resistance to the austerity measures, Greece has been a focus of news
about the euro stimulus and of meetings between European leaders. The handling of
Greece and other struggling countries has intensified national differences within the EU.
The initial decision of how to proceed in Greece established how the Union would
proceed with other struggling nations, like Spain. There was a lack of cooperation
37

Bastasin, Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro, 74.
Ibid., 74.
39
Ibid., 74.
40
Ibid., 104.
41
Ibid., 84.
38
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leading up to the first bailout in Greece. The Germans wanted to make a plan before
acting in Greece, but others involved did not and wanted to push the details off until
later.42 The Germans wanted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) involved to lessen
the consequences on all the member states of Europe. Others did not want the IMF
involved because then Americans would control what is happening in Greece, something
the Germans said was already happening to a degree because of the United States’
economic power.43 This time of butting heads was a low point in the crisis for the EU; no
one was sure what would happen. In 2010, the EU looked as if it would collapse. AntiEuropeans, particularly in Britain, tried to make collapse happen faster and called for
referendums, court cases in Germany questioned the legality of the union’s actions in
Greece, and polarized parties throughout Europe increased power.44 Having struggling
countries, like Spain, leave the Eurozone, having Germany leave, and reducing the
Eurozone to Northern Europe only were all options at this time.45
Although economic actions and policy formations have seemed to calm down
since, Europe is struggling. Spain went into a recession in 2012. The country required
outside help and unpopular budget reforms, a development that led to other European
leaders blaming German policymakers for wanting too much reform too fast.46
Unemployment in Spain has also remained high, which has led to protests.47

42

Bastasin, Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro, 167.
Ibid., 168.
44
Preston, England after the Great Recession, 67.
45
Ibid., 71.
46
Mayer, Europe’s Unfinished Currency, 181.
47
PBS NewsHour, “Greeks March Against Austerity Measures,” PBS Newshour video, 6:28, September
26, 2012, accessed November 30, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec12/greece2_0926.html
43
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Review of Research
Below is a chart of research dealing with differences in news and culture in the
countries included in this thesis. Some studies compare two or more of the countries in
this thesis. Others only have information about one of the four countries in the thesis.
The table organizes the studies in the order they appear in the review of research. The
columns indicate which of the four countries the studies cover.
Figure 2-1: Chart of Comparative research
Study/Country United States
Britain
Esser 1999
X
Hanitzsch 2011
X
Hanitzsch and
X
Berganza 2012
Hanitzsch and
X
Mellado 2011
Janssen et al.
X
2008
Kolmer and
X
X
Semetko 2009
Esser 2008
X
X
Hallin and
X
X
Mancini 2004
Egido 2010
Benson et al.
X
2012
Esser 2013
X
X
Van Dalen 2012
X

Germany
X
X
X
X

Spain
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

News Culture
News culture has roots in cultural norms of expression and communication style.
In addition to reflecting the culture of a place, news culture is also a reflection of the role
of journalism in a society. For example, a common division in news cultures is between
tabloid and informational news. The purpose of tabloid news is to entertain the reader,
which benefits the reader alone, whereas the purpose of informational news is to inform
the reader, which can be beneficial to society. The two overlap to different degrees in

13

different places, as studies of tabloidization of political news show. One study found that
tabloid journalism was not as strong in Germany as in Britain.48

The study focused on

the role of preferences in the tabloidization of news, although other societal factors could
also play a role. The types of stories readers preferred and the methods journalists used
in Germany all indicated a skew toward traditional, informative journalism over
tabloidization. The study also found that German journalists value intellectual
information more than entertainment, which is part of why there are comparatively more
non-tabloid news stories in Germany than in Britain.
Surveys of journalists’ attitudes have also found differences among news cultures
in different countries. Scholars have approached the study of differences among
journalists of different nationalities from a variety of angles. Studies determined which
professional roles,49 influences on journalists’ trust in public institutions,50 and influences
on content51 are most prevalent in different countries.
Professional roles are important to news culture because they show how media
workers view the place of journalists and news in society. The professional roles
Hanitzsch studied included populist disseminator, detached watchdog, critical change
agent, and opportunist facilitator. Populist disseminators produce interesting content that
attracts a wide audience. The populist disseminator role requires the journalist to remain

48

Frank Esser, “ ‘Tabloidization' of News A Comparative Analysis of Anglo-American and German Press
Journalism,” European Journal of Communication 14, no. 3 (1999), 296.
49
Thomas Hanitzsch, “Populist Disseminators, Detached Watchdogs, Critical Change Agents and
Opportunist Facilitators Professional Milieus, the Journalistic Field and Autonomy in 18
Countries,” International Communication Gazette 73, no. 6 (2011), 477.
50
Thomas Hanitzsch and Rosa Berganza, “Explaining Journalists' Trust in Public Institutions Across 20
Countries: Media Freedom, Corruption, and Ownership Matter Most,” Journal of Communication 62, no. 5
(2012), 794.
51
Thomas Hanitzsch and Claudia Mellado, “What shapes the news around the world? How journalists in
eighteen countries perceive influences on their work,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 16, no. 3
(2011), 404.

14

an observer in the reporting and not a participant. Detached watchdogs work as critical,
unbiased observers. Critical change agents are also critical but try to influence the public
directly with their work. Opportunist facilitators use the content they produce to further
the government’s interests.52
Below is a table of the distribution of professional roles in the study above. In the
United States, the detached watchdog role was the most prevalent, followed by critical
change agent, populist disseminator, and opportunist facilitator. In Germany, the
detached watchdog role was also most prevalent, followed by populist disseminator,
critical change agent, and opportunist facilitator. Spanish journalists were mostly
populist disseminators, followed by detached watchdogs and opportunist facilitators
being almost even in percentage. Critical change agents were the least prevalent in the
Spanish sample compared to the other milieus. The results show that journalists in the
United States and Germany are similar in trying to separate the news from the
government while the Spanish journalists are less likely to do so. Such attitudes affect
how journalists handle political and economic news, which could cause differences in
content.
Table 2-1: Results from Hanitzsch 201153
Germany
United States
69%
64%
Detached
Watchdog
16%
11%
Populist
Disseminator
10%
21%
Critical
Change Agent
4%
4%
Opportunist
Facilitator

52

Spain
25%

Britain
N/A

39%

N/A

12%

N/A

24%

N/A

Hanitzsch, “Populist Disseminators, Detached Watchdogs, Critical Change Agents and Opportunist
Facilitators Professional Milieus,” 484-6.
53
Ibid., 487.
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Trust in the institutions of a society is also part of news culture and can come
through in content. Mutual distrust between politicians and journalists could transfer to
news coverage. The distrust can affect the information politicians share with journalists.
Distrust can also show itself in how journalists present political information in coverage,
which can affect public trust. Hanitzsch and Berganza found that political performance,
ownership of the media, and interpersonal trust within a society had the greatest influence
on journalists’ institutional trust.54 Power distance between journalists and people in
power, or whether the media were a watchdog in a given country, and journalistic culture
had less influence on institutional trust. There was typically less institutional trust in
places with more democracy, possibly because journalists could be watchdogs and share
critical information about the government. The biggest differences in trust were between
countries, not between news organizations within them. The differences between
Germany and the United States were small in the variables studied, but the Germans had
greater institutional trust than the Americans did. Spanish journalists had less
institutional trust than the Germans but more than the Americans did. Personal trust and
power distance were much lower in Spain than in Germany or the United States.
There are other influences on content in addition to trust. Content influences
include political, economic, organizational, professional, procedural, and reference group
influences.55 Political influences included influences from officials and policy.
Economic influences had to do with the market, advertising, and profits. Organizational
influences referred to the editorial decisions and management of the newsroom and news
organization. Procedural influences included time and resource constraints as well as

54
55

Hanitzsch and Berganza, “Explaining Journalists' Trust in Public Institutions,” 802.
Hanitzsch and Mellado, “What shapes the news around the world?” 406-7.
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journalistic standards. Professional influences were policies and media law. Reference
groups were colleagues, audiences, and personal connections. The journalists in the
survey perceived procedural, professional, and organizational influences to be most
important overall while rating economic and political as the least important. German
journalists considered all influences less significant than the American ones did. The
Spanish participants viewed political and economic factors as more influential than their
American and German counterparts did,56 which their role perception of working as a
companion to the government rather than separately can explain.
This body of research on news culture shows through surveys that cultural
influences affect journalists. The cultural influences affect role perceptions, trust in
institutions, and content. Even though this thesis relies on content analysis rather than
surveys, the results of surveys give information about possible cultural influences on
content. For example, the role perceptions show that Spanish journalists are more likely
to support the government agenda. German and American journalists are more likely to
consider themselves watchdogs and be critical of the government agenda. Content
analysis will show whether journalists demonstrate their perceived influences in content.
News
News Content
Comparisons of coverage of specific genres or events have shown differences
among countries in news content. For example, Janssen et al.’s content analysis of arts
journalism in Dutch, French, German, and American prestige press between 1955 and
2005 revealed some interesting differences. Dutch and German newspapers had more

56

Hanitzsch and Mellado, “What shapes the news around the world?” 414-6.
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international arts coverage and increased this international coverage over the years.57
The trend most likely happened because the two countries were not central figures in the
global arts scene as France and the United States were, so many of the major stories had
to be international. Only the United States did not increase international focus over time.
While these results do not deal with the euro crisis, they do show that the more prominent
countries in an area of social life, in this case the arts, are more likely to focus on
themselves than look to other countries. A national focus in prominent countries may
also be true in economic reporting. How journalists cover war can also differ by
nationality, as found in Kolmer and Semetko’s study of television coverage of the
“official” three to four-week war in Iraq in 2003 in six countries. The approaches in
reporting were substantially different in countries less supportive of the war, like
Germany, compared to reporting in countries more involved in the war, like the United
States. For example, the Germans did not use embedded journalists because of military
propaganda concerns. German journalists also reported more on subjects like the role of
journalists in the war, the politics at play, the role of the UN and other third parties, and
problems faced by civilians. The American coverage, on the other hand, focused more
on military actions. American coverage was also three times more likely to use a positive
spin in stories about the Allies than German news organizations. The British results fell
in between the German and American ones.58

57

Susanne Janssen et al., “Cultural Globalization and Arts Journalism: The International Orientation of
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Research into sound and image bites in French, German, British, and American
news also found national differences in content.59 German newscasts had the least
political coverage on newscasts due to the separate, politically specialized programs that
are prevalent in Germany. The British newscasts had the most political coverage.
American newscasts had the shortest sound bites. Britain and Germany had the most
reporter narration in relation to sound bites while France had the least. Reporter narration
presumably takes away time from the politician in the sound bite, which means public
officials can speak for themselves more in France than in Britain or Germany. Attack
rhetoric was a main feature of American news whereas campaigning was more dominant
in other countries. The results showed that the French were the least interventionist and
Americans the most. These differences hint even more at differences in attitudes in
different countries affecting news content.
News Development: Models of Media Systems
Studies dealing with models of media systems have connected culture to news and
regional trends in media system development. Hallin and Mancini compared systems in
different countries based on media markets, links between media and politics, journalistic
development, and state intervention to come up with three main regional models.60 The
model of southern European countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and to an extent
France is the “polarized pluralism” model. The countries in this group have many
distinct political parties that cover the entire political spectrum.61 Politicians and the
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media are very connected because elites are the target audience for newspapers.62 These
countries’ media systems evolved in similar ways, with most having roots in opinion
press and dictatorship.63 They also had the tendency to have a partisan press but not
necessarily a party press.64 Compared to other regions, this group exhibited less
professional development among journalists, although that does not mean they are not
educated.65 Egido had similar findings about Spanish journalism in particular. He
pointed out that language used in economic news in Spain is very rooted in social values
and ideology66 and is not always politically neutral because of a more partisan press,67
reflecting parts of Spain’s culture.
The liberal model is present in Britain, Ireland, Canada, and the United States.
According to the researchers, the model’s traits include limited government,
individualism, commercialism, and emphasis on “objectivity” in news. However, Britain
is more continental because of its partisan press.68 These countries are connected less by
geographical region than the other groups in the study and more by use of the English
language.69
Scandinavia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the German-speaking
countries make up the “democratic corporatist” group.70 This group is something
between the liberal and polarized pluralist models because its characteristics include both
commercial and party press. These countries also have a wide spectrum of political
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parties, press freedom, and some state intervention.71 State help for the “common good”
and strong welfare systems that encourage a degree of collectivity are prominent in these
countries.72
The researchers speculated that all of the models are gradually homogenizing and
becoming more liberal due to globalization.73 However, a more recent study found that
the models have continued their differences online.74 The findings showed the move
from print to online did not change content much in the French polarized pluralist model.
However, news sites in the American liberal model feature more advertising, opinion,
and fluffy local news. The Danish democratic corporatist news sites showed mixed
results, illustrating the model’s similarities to the other two models. The study shows the
models Hallin and Mancini wrote about can explain trends, but their speculations about
homogenization may not apply.
Content analysis of political coverage in American, British, German, Swiss, and
Italian newspapers offered more model variation than Hallin and Mancini’s study did.
The content analysis found that the United States had a clear model that emphasized
“rational news analysis.” The Italian model was clearly polarized, and the German model
heavily mixed news and opinion. These countries closely represented Hallin and
Mancini’s models. The other countries fell somewhere between the other models.
British news in some ways was very close to the American and German models. The
Swiss news was very close to the German model. The French news was in some ways
somewhere between the Italian and German. The French and British models were
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hardest to place in relation to other countries.75 The American papers were most
objective followed by the Germans while the Italian papers were the least.76 The German
and Swiss papers were the least negative and the French and Italian ones were the most.77
The American reporting tended to include expert opinions more than others did, leading
to more “rational analysis” while the German and Swiss papers had less analytical news
but more prominent opinion pieces.78
Models of media systems are also very closely related to news cultures. Research
has shown that attitudes of journalists toward their roles can influence reporting styles
and interpretations of the role of journalism. Another study worked under the assumption
that Spain had a polarized pluralist model, Britain a liberal model, and Germany and
Denmark a democratic corporatist model, in keeping with Hallin and Mancini’s
findings.79 The results revealed how the models affected attitudes toward politics. The
Spanish journalists believed politics were newsworthy just for being politics. Danish
journalists were much like the Spanish in attitude but not in content. The British and
German journalists were least likely to believe politics were newsworthy just for being
politics. British journalists valued entertainment and scandals more than the others did.
The Spanish journalists were more partisan than the others were. 80
This body of research on media models and news content shows differences in
content and attitudes based on historical development of news systems. The patterns
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found in this research give insight into the relationship among cultural and national
differences, news production practices, and news content. Such connections give a good
background for the examination of the connections among culture, economic policy, and
news content in this thesis.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
While all this information from previous research about linguistic choices,
journalist attitudes, and content of newspapers and television broadcasts offers useful
background, the studies more often deal with coverage of national issues or singular
international events, like battles in a war or elections, than with ongoing international
issues, like an economic crisis. The differences in the situation in this study as opposed
to the existing research lead to the following questions:
RQ1: How were the newspapers studied different in terms of amount of coverage
of the euro crisis? In other words, how many articles did each have on the
subject during the specified time periods and how long were they?
RQ2: How was the focus of coverage different in each paper? Did certain topics
get more attention than others did?
In addition to finding basic differences in news content, the goal of this thesis is to
explore connections among national culture, news coverage, and economic policy
decisions.
For the economic policy measure, the demonstrated government stance on
austerity and bailouts for struggling countries determined the ranking for each nation.
Articles about policy in The New York Times during the weeks in the study revealed the
demonstrated stances. Measurements included only British, German, and Spanish
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economic policies because American economic policy is different from policy in Europe.
American policy also had no bearing on the euro crisis as policy in the other three
countries did because the United States is not part of the EU. The articles gave insight as
to what national leaders were saying about austerity and bailouts as well as what sorts of
actions politicians were taking. National leaders accepting austerity or bailouts and
putting austerity or bailout policies into use indicated a positive government stance
toward austerity or bailouts. The opposite would demonstrate a negative government
stance. The indicated stances determined whether a country’s policies would support
austerity or bailouts. For example, in terms of austerity, German policy favors austerity
very much. The New York Times articles showed that politicians have been pushing for
austerity for a while in Germany and more recently have pushed austerity in the rest of
Europe.81 A country whose policies went against austerity would not show such support.
Although British politicians encouraged fiscal stimulus in Greece in 2010,82 British
policy is also favorable to austerity domestically. The government has been cutting
spending to reduce its national deficit for a while.83 Spanish policy has also reflected
austerity measures in its national budget for 2013,84 which was part of a series of
measures taken to reduce the national deficit.85 Spanish leaders have implemented
austerity measures largely because of pressure from other European leaders. Many
people in Spain have shown hostility toward the proposed austerity measures. German
policy was most friendly toward austerity because German leaders have insisted on
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austerity both domestically and in other countries. British policy was second in support
of austerity because austerity measures were in place there and were implemented
without outside pressure. Spanish policy was least friendly toward austerity because
although austerity measures were in place, they only came after outside pressure.
In terms of bailouts to struggling countries, the Germans were consistently wary
of giving aid and pushed austerity instead.86 However, Britain was even more hostile
toward the idea during the time period in this thesis and refused to take part in any
bailouts in Greece.87 Spain was the friendliest to bailouts because it needed one, although
the Spanish prime minister consistently called the Spanish bailout a “line of credit.”88
Perhaps the euphemism indicated less favor toward bailouts in Spain than would be
expected had he not used a euphemism.89 In this case, Spanish policy was the most
supportive of bailouts because the country accepted one, although not overwhelmingly
supportive because of the stigma associated with bailouts in Spain. German policy came
next in support of bailouts because even though German politicians resisted, they still
took part. British policy was most hostile toward bailouts because Britain refused to take
part in any bailouts.
The following hypotheses show the expectations in ranking of policy within news
coverage:
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H1a: If news content were to follow national economic policy trends, German
news would be the most favorable toward austerity, followed by the
British news, with Spanish news being the least favorable toward
austerity.
H1b: If news content were to follow national economic policy trends, Spanish
news would be the most favorable toward bailouts for struggling
countries, followed by the German news, with British news being the least
favorable toward bailouts.
One measure of culture related to news is the role of journalists. Many studies
have investigated journalists’ role perceptions in different countries. One clear divide
among journalists of different cultures is whether they believe their role is to support the
government or to act as a watchdog of the government. Such differences in role
perceptions can affect news content.90 A study of role perceptions across the world found
that in both Germany and the United States, most journalists considered their role to be
that of a watchdog by a significant margin.91 Only four percent of journalists in each
country thought they should further the government agenda. In Spain, the differences
between role perceptions were not as great, although significantly more Spanish
journalists considered it their role to further government interests than German and
American journalists did. The percentage of Spanish journalists who considered
themselves watchdogs was essentially the same as the percentage that would further
government interests. In a related study that measured how journalists perceived
influences on their work, Spanish participants were more likely to find influences from
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officials, policy, and the economics most important than their American and German
counterparts were.92 The Spanish results relate to Spanish journalists’ perceived roles in
furthering government interests.
Studies of media system models are also in line with the findings about role
perceptions and influences. Hallin and Mancini found that the model in Spain was very
connected to politicians, whereas the American and British models were more
commercial than political. The German model was a mixture of politics and
commercialism.93 One study that investigated role perceptions and content found that the
Spanish journalists believed politics was newsworthy just for being politics and reflected
this attitude in news content.94 The British and German journalists and news content
were very similar to each other. Both were also less likely to cover politics just for being
politics.
Based on all of this information, the presence of support of a nation’s government
in news content would indicate cultural influence in terms of role perception. More
specifically, the influence of role perception on content would show that journalists’
attitudes affect the news. The international findings about government support in role
perceptions lead to the following hypothesis:
H2: If journalistic roles are apparent in coverage, Spanish coverage will be the
most likely to support the government, followed by German coverage,
British coverage, and finally American coverage.
Culture also affects the amount of opinion in newspapers. Research about media
models, surveys of journalists, and other connections between culture and news points
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out differences in the amount of opinion in different countries’ newspapers. Hallin and
Mancini said that Spanish news is rooted in opinion and partisan press. The German
press also presents a lot of opinion. They also said the British and American press are
similar in that they are less partisan and have less opinion.95 The Hallin and Mancini
study determined the ranking in H2 because the study was the only one to present all four
countries. However, more limited studies found patterns consistent with Hallin and
Mancini’s findings. Esser found that American news did not have much opinion while
German news had many prominent opinion pieces.96 British news fell somewhere in
between. Hanusch found that German news tends to focus more on opinion than British
and American news.97 Egido said that Spanish news commonly uses opinion because of
the partisan press.98 A ranking the countries by amount of opinion in the sample offers a
second measure of the effects of culture on news content. The previous research on
opinion in news leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: Based on the existing research about culture in news, Spain should have the
most opinion in its sample, followed by Germany, then Britain, and finally
the United States.
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Figure 2-2: Diagram of Relationships among Key Concepts in Hypotheses

Culture

A

B

News
Content

Policy

A: Culture affects the news by influencing how journalists express ideas, which type of information
delivery (e.g. strictly informative or more opinion-based) they prefer, and how journalists perceive their
roles and influences on their work.
B: News can influence policy by affecting voter decisions and helping inform policy makers. Perhaps lack
of focus on European issues in national media in the EU could partially explain problems with unity (see de
Vreese 2001). Policy can also influence news by providing content when leaders enact or change policy, or
when leaders use policy to make political decisions.
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Chapter 3: Methods
Methodology
Content analysis was the best way to address the research questions and measure
policy and culture indicators in news content. Content analysis allows for direct
measurement of news content, which is one of the variables in this thesis. Content
analysis is also more appropriate than other methods in this instance because the attitudes
of journalists measured in surveys do not always match what appears in the content.99
The results would determine whether the attitudes found in previous studies appear in the
news content in this particular case. News content itself is important in the euro crisis
because it can influence public opinion, which in turn could affect the future of the EU.
The demonstrated stances in each newspaper give a better indicator of the ideas presented
to readers than surveys of journalists would. The results will allow us to see how the
content possibly reflects national news culture and economic policy.
Sample and Data Collection
This thesis examined four particularly eventful periods from 2011 and 2012. The
focus fell on the fifteen months between Greece requesting a second bailout in June 2011
and major austerity protests in Southern Europe in September 2012. The first period
examined was from June 17 through June 25, 2011. Greece requested a second bailout
during this period. The second period spanned from January 27 until February 4, 2012,
during which European leaders had to make economic decisions at an EU summit. The
third period came from June 7-15, 2012 because of Spain requesting aid from the
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European Union during that time. September 14-28, 2012 made up the last period
because of the austerity protests in Portugal, Spain, and Greece.
Newspaper coverage for each country came from well-studied elite newspapers.
The Spanish coverage came from El País, the German from the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, the British from The Times, and the American from The New York Times. Each
of these newspapers comes from the financial capital of its respective country, which
makes this set of newspapers especially relevant for this thesis. Researchers consider
elite newspapers better subjects than other papers for international comparison studies
because of the influence and standard practices of the elite newspapers.100
The newspapers were available electronically. El País, The Times, and The New
York Times were all available on the LexisNexis Academic database. The search results
within the database gave the page numbers from the physical newspaper for the articles
that were not online only. The page numbers made it easy to pick out the articles that
appeared in the print version of the newspaper, which is an ideal way of limiting the
sample. Although some versions of LexisNexis carry the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, the version of the database available to me at the time of writing this thesis did
not have it, nor did the database have any other national German newspapers. Instead,
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s website provided the platform to find relevant
articles. Interlibrary loan aided in finding the text of the articles because a subscription is
required to view any article more than one month old on the website. The website’s
search results showed which section the article appeared in, like economics or politics.
The sample included only articles filed under sections that appear in the print newspaper,
which are the standard economics, politics, business, etc. The sample did not include
100
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articles from the Rhein-Main insert because they are specific to the area around Frankfurt.
Those articles also do not necessarily appear in the print versions of the paper in other
parts of Germany. While it was not possible to know for sure that all of the articles
included in the sample appeared in the print newspaper, the sample more likely included
articles that appeared in print because of the applied limitations.
The main purpose of this thesis was to explore connections among national news
culture, economic policy, and content of the news. While the print versions were more
likely the versions of the paper most people consumed, there was no way to be sure
because of the attention shifting from print to online articles and news apps. Web-only
articles would also show connections among culture, policy, and news content.
For the purpose of this study, euro crisis coverage included news about any steps
leaders were taking to rescue Europe’s economy. Euro crisis coverage also included
steps ordinary people were taking to deal with the economy. Rescue steps could include
meetings among EU and national leaders to discuss economic actions to take, the
economic actions themselves, backlash following the meetings and actions, and general
discussion of the fate of the euro. The articles about ordinary people dealt with how the
people handled unemployment, lower wages, loss of pensions, and other economic
effects of the crisis. Articles did not need to focus on the Eurozone as a whole to be
included. Because the countries of Europe are so interconnected and their national
economies directly affect the overall European economy, stories relating to national
economies within the Eurozone were also part of the sample. To avoid including articles
that only mentioned topics related to the euro crisis as a side note, there had to be a
mention of the Eurozone economy, the economy of a country in the Eurozone, or the euro
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crisis within the first three paragraphs of the article. An early mention made clear the
article dealt with aspects of the crisis as more than a side note.
Coding and Analysis
To answer RQ1, the articles were coded for length. The number of articles was
also be taken into account. Length was measured in character count, including spaces,
but not including titles or bylines. Length measurements using character count can avoid
inaccuracies due to different width of article space that would come about by counting
lines. Because articles came from digital sources, they were copied and pasted into a
Microsoft Word document to get the character count.
For RQ2, focus was the main topic of the article. To measure this, the article was
coded for topic category. The coding included the following categories: human interest,
austerity, bailouts, currency values, meetings between leaders, resistance, general
economic effects, and miscellaneous. Human interest stories dealt with things like
unemployment, education costs, consumer interests, and in general how individuals were
dealing with the economic problems in their day-to-day lives. This category did not
include stories about protests. The articles included only feature stories that typically
started out with the personal story of an individual or small group. Articles dealing with
austerity measures or cutbacks to government spending were in the austerity category.
Any stories about economic stimulus, aid to other countries, and loans were in the
bailouts category. Currency value stories included those about currency devaluation and
exchange rates fluctuating between the euro and other currencies. Meetings between
leaders included any event coverage of summits and economy-related leader visits to
other countries. Resistance stories included those about protests and, if applicable,
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national leaders refusing to follow EU policy. The general economic effects category
included articles about businesses closing, banking issues, and other effects of the crisis.
These stories were regular news articles and, unlike the human interest stories, did not
include any feature stories about an individual or small group. Stories that dealt with the
euro crisis but did not fit into any of the previous categories were miscellaneous. The
coding accounted for only the principal topic. Headlines and leads gave clues to
determine the principal topic if it was not clear from looking at the story holistically.
H1a and H1b deal with policy. These hypotheses had their own separate entries
on the coding sheet. Having coding areas for austerity and bailouts independent from
topic allowed for inclusion of articles with underlying stances on these subjects that were
not principally about austerity or bailouts. Inclusion of such articles made it easier to
determine overall stance on austerity and bailouts by increasing the sample size for the
measure. Articles with direct mention of austerity measures or bailouts to struggling
countries and what the policies were doing were coded for the presented stance. Merely
mentioning the policies exist or giving details of what they are did not mean the article
showed a stance. Effects or action had to be part of the story for there to be a stance.
Anything that said that austerity or bailouts were not working or were harming Europe or
a given country had a negative stance. Articles that said that austerity or bailouts were
working or were helping Europe were positive in stance. Anything that presented a view
balanced with positive and negative or did not have a clear stance despite giving details
of what austerity or bailouts were doing was neutral. This measure included both the
opinions present in the article and which facts journalists chose to include.
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Culture was observed in the news from all four countries by measuring the
demonstrated support for the government and the proportions of articles on news and
opinion pages. Previous research pointed to these characteristics as part of culture in
news. The category an article appeared in according to the search results determined
whether an article appeared on a news or opinion page. If the article was under
“opinion,” “editorial,” or an equivalent, it was coded as being on an opinion page. All
other categories were considered news pages.
The measure of government support included opinions about the government
within an article. The measure only included opinions, not the use of selected facts as in
the policy measures. Only opinions counted in this measure to stay in line with the
previous research on which the hypothesis was based. The previous research’s findings
either came from measuring opinion or were not clear enough to determine whether the
results came from opinion measurements or something broader, so measuring only the
presented opinions made more sense in this case. These specifications restricted the
content considered in news articles mostly to quotes in which interviewees offered their
view about the government or any time the author presented a viewpoint instead of a fact.
Opinion pieces were treated the same way so the facts included did not count for this
measure, but the viewpoints did. Viewpoints that were critical of the government were
not supportive. Positive viewpoints were supportive. A mixture of critical and positive
or not leaning one way or another was neutral. This measure also only included stances
toward the national government of each respective newspaper. Stances toward foreign
governments were not part of the measurement because they were not part of the
measurements in the existing research on which the hypothesis was based. Stance toward
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the German government was only measured in the German coverage, stance toward the
Spanish government was only measured in the Spanish coverage, and so on.
As described above, the coding schemes for H1a, H1b, and H2 were rather
conservative. The measures avoided finding stance where there was no stance because
they were very specific. The only stances included in the coding were stances toward
austerity, bailouts, and the national government. Because of that, only a few articles in
this thesis had a coded stance. Articles could have had a stance on other issues, like
foreign governments or banking practices, but those stances were not part of the coding.
Interpretation of the patterns that arose from the results of the coding addressed
the research questions and hypotheses. The total number of articles in each newspaper’s
sample, the total number of characters, and the average number of characters answered
RQ1. The percentage of the total sample for each newspaper that dealt with each topic
determined the proportions for each topic. The calculations included number of articles
rather than number of characters. Proportions for each topic were compared based on
relative size for each paper to determine which appeared the most. Differences between
the proportions in each newspaper also provided answers to RQ2.
Comparison of the results for the hypotheses to the information and results of
previous research revealed connections between news content, culture, and economic
policy. The rankings in the hypotheses were compared to the proportions found in the
analysis of news content based on the culture and policy measures. Frequencies and
averages calculated for each category involved in the hypotheses revealed the proportions
and skew for each newspaper. The results also created a “real” ranking to compare to the
hypothesized one. The newspaper with the greatest skew as shown by the averages
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toward positive policy stance, government support, or opinion had the largest positive
policy stance, supportive government stance, or amount of opinion. The newspaper
appeared in the “real” ranking accordingly. The next greatest skew toward positive
policy stance, government support, and amount of opinion went next in the ranking, and
so on. If the ranking matched the one in the hypothesis, the data supported the
hypothesis. If the rankings did not match, the data did not support the hypothesis. The
frequencies calculated for each hypothesis gave points of discussion by showing how
often a stance was present versus no stance at all.
Intercoder reliability was calculated for the English-language samples from The
Times and The New York Times with a second coder whose native language is English.
The calculation ensured the measures used could produce similar results among different
researchers. The second coder and I coded a random sample of 25 of the American and
25 of the British articles to determine intercoder reliability. Percent agreement and
Cohen’s kappa are two common ways of calculating intercoder reliability in content
analysis.101 This thesis presents calculations from both to be as accurate as possible
because percent agreement can overestimate reliability while Cohen’s kappa tends to be
more conservative.102 For both, the higher the results, the better the reliability.103
The second coder coded the random sample for all of the measures. We discussed
the coding scheme in depth before the second coder received the sample. The discussion
included some examples to make sure everything was clear. Because the coding scheme
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was complex, I also gave the second coder a coding rule sheet to refer to while coding.
The sheet included all of the coding details we discussed in person. The sheet was the
same one I used while coding to ensure consistency. When the second coder was
finished, we discussed the differences. We agreed on the correct coding of all
disagreements that stemmed from uncertainty in the coding rules. The results below
reflect the coding after this discussion. The differences that remained followed my
coding in the results presented in the next chapter.
All of the length and opinion coding matched exactly. The other measures were
more subjective and had varying degrees of reliability. The topic categories could
overlap at times and in some situations were not very distinct. Percent agreement for the
topic measure was 86 percent, while the Cohen’s kappa result was 0.82. By both
measures, intercoder reliability for topic was high. The austerity measure got 84 percent
agreement but had a Cohen’s kappa of 0.64. There are different interpretations of what is
an acceptable Cohen’s kappa, but according to a widely cited scale, the reliability for this
measure was fairly good.104 The bailout measure got 78 percent agreement and a
Cohen’s kappa of 0.50. The support measure had 90 percent agreement and a Cohen’s
kappa of 0.51. The reliability for these measures was moderate.105 However, the high
number of articles without a demonstrated stance brought down the Cohen’s kappa
results by making the probability of agreement by chance higher. The topic measure was
varied enough for the probability of agreement by chance to be low, so the Cohen’s
kappa for topic stayed high.
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Chapter 4: Results
Amount of Coverage and Topic
RQ1 dealt with the amount of coverage in each newspaper in terms of the number
of articles and length. The findings are in Table 4-1. Spain had the most articles in the
sample with 260 stories. Spain also had the highest total character count of 1,198,746
characters, including spaces, in the sample. Britain had the least coverage with only 100
articles and 368,590 characters including spaces. American coverage totaled 136 stories
and 760,780 characters while German coverage yielded 150 stories and 803,510
characters. In terms of average story length, the United States had the longest articles
with an average of 5,594 characters with spaces. Britain had the shortest articles overall
with an average of 3,686 characters with spaces per article. The average German story
was 5,357 characters long, and the average Spanish story was 4,611 characters long.
Perhaps Spain had the most coverage of the four countries because the crisis hit
Spain harder than it hit the others. Britain may have had the least coverage and the
shortest articles because the country was trying to distance itself from the EU. British
coverage content showed active distancing from and criticism of the EU, which could
explain why Britain had less coverage than the United States despite belonging to the EU.
Table 4-1: Amount of Coverage
Country
Total Number of
Articles (N=646)
Spain
260
Germany
150
Britain
100
United States
136

Total Characters
1,198,746
803,510
368,590
760,780

Average Story
Length
4,611
5,357
3,686
5,594

RQ2 addressed which topics received the most attention. Table 4-2 shows the
frequency of each topic in each newspaper. General effects stories were consistently the
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most frequent in each newspaper. However, trends in focus within the miscellaneous and
general effects categories revealed the subcategories shown in Table 4-3, which provided
better comparison. These subcategories were useful in comparing which types of general
effects stories each paper used. The subcategories also pulled out any topics that were
not part of the original coding and ended up in the miscellaneous category. The
subcategories did not affect the other topic categories, just the general effects and
miscellaneous categories. Many of the subcategories had to do with finance or business.
Table 4-2: Topic Distribution (% total coverage rounded to nearest whole percent)
Spain
Germany
Britain
United States
29%
43%
30%
General Effects 31%
22%
29%
18%
24%
Bailouts
19%
13%
9%
16%
Miscellaneous
10%
13%
15%
10%
Meetings
8%
4%
7%
7%
Austerity
4%
5%
2%
9%
Human
Interest
6%
4%
2%
5%
Resistance
0%
2%
4%
0%
Currency
Values
Total Number of 260
150
100
136
Articles
Table 4-3: Subcategories in the general effects and miscellaneous categories (% total
coverage rounded to nearest whole percent)
Spain
Germany
Britain
United States
19%
12%
24%
7%
Other Societal
Effects
13%
7%
8%
11%
Unique Topic
4%
9%
7%
15%
Market Effects
8%
5%
6%
6%
Banking
1%
1%
7%
1%
Business Effects
5%
5%
0%
2%
Overview
1%
3%
0%
1%
Credit Ratings
0%
1%
0%
2%
Historical
Comparison
Total Number of
131
64
52
63
Articles
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Stories within the banking subcategory focused on what local and national banks,
as well as the European Central Bank, were doing to deal with the crisis. Credit rating
stories dealt with the credit ratings of countries changing. Market effects stories had to
do with the effects of the crisis on stocks, bonds, and investments. Overview stories
focused on the background of the crisis or gave general information about the crisis
within Europe as a whole or within a certain country. Historical comparison stories
focused on comparing the current situation to another situation in the near or distant past.
Some compared the Greek situation to the Lehman Brothers or the euro crisis to the Great
Depression. Business effects stories included stories about businesses closing or the
effects of the crisis on how people run businesses. The “other societal effects”
subcategory included stories that did not fit into the other subcategories but dealt with
societal effects of the crisis. Any stories that still did not fit into any of the subcategories
were re-coded as part of the “unique topic” subcategory. The stories that were coded as
“unique topic” stories had no common denominator, which meant they could not form
additional, more specific subcategories.
Taking all of the categories and subcategories into account, a few were
particularly frequent across all newspapers. Bailout stories were prominent in all of the
newspapers, showing the importance of the bailouts in the crisis. Such stories were the
most prominent category in all but The Times, in which the “other societal effects”
subcategory was the most frequent. The “other societal effects” subcategory was
frequent in the three European newspapers but not in the American one. The frequency
of the “other societal effects” showed that stories about effects outside of finance and
business were more popular overall in the European newspapers. Stories about finance
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and business wound up in the other subcategories. The prevalence of the “unique topic”
subcategory, although difficult to compare among countries because each individual story
in the category was the only one of its kind, shows the difference in perspective of each
newspaper. The subcategory was a bit larger than the other more specific subcategories
but had relatively low percentages compared to the overarching category results.
Meetings stories were also among the most frequent in all of the newspapers. The slight
differences in topic proportion also revealed some differences between countries. Market
effects, historical comparison, and human interest stories were more prominent in the
United States than in the other countries. Business effects and meetings stories were
more frequent in Britain than in the others. The German newspaper had more frequent
bailout and less frequent austerity stories than the others did. Resistance stories were
slightly more frequent in the Spanish newspaper than in the others. The Spanish paper
also had a higher proportion of banking stories than the others did.
Despite the differences in topic distribution across newspapers, the distributions
were often very similar. The overall similarity of topic distribution could show that
decisions of which topics to cover were dictated more than economic reality and events
than by cultural or political differences.
Policy in the News
H1a and H1b dealt with policy and news, saying that the stance toward austerity
and bailouts in economic policy in each country would predict the stance shown in the
different newspapers. H1a stated that because Germany’s economic policy was most
friendly to austerity, its newspaper coverage would be too. Britain was in the middle, and
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Spain was supposed to be the most negative. The results supported this hypothesis, as
seen in Table 4-4.
Table 4-4: Austerity in the News
Country
Austerity Policy
Description
Main supporter of austerity
Germany
in the EU, has domestic
austerity policies and
encourages other countries
to adopt austerity as well106
Has domestic austerity
Britain
policies107
Has adopted austerity
Spain
policies with encouragement
from the EU108

Average Austerity Stance in the
News*
2.47 (2=neutral)
(N with stance=15)

1.50 (N with stance=26)
1.32 (N with stance=75)

*Only of articles that had a stance toward austerity. Those that did not show a stance were not included in
the calculation.

Table 4-5: Frequency of Austerity Stance (% of total rounded to nearest whole
percent)
Country
No Austerity
Negative
Neutral/Balanced Positive
Stance Shown
90%
0%
5%
5%
Germany
74%
16%
7%
3%
Britain
71%
21%
7%
1%
Spain
Total Number
394
70
33
13
of Articles in
Each Category
The German coverage was very positive toward austerity, reflecting German
economic policy. Both the British and Spanish coverage skewed negative, with Spanish
being slightly more negative. The frequency of each stance seen in Table 4-5 also offers
some insight. As expected, most articles in the sample did not show a stance toward
austerity. The German coverage was least likely to have a stance on austerity, while
Spanish coverage was most likely. German coverage had no stories with a negative
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stance but had a positive stance more frequently in comparison to the other newspapers.
Five percent of German stories were positive. Spanish coverage showed the inverse, with
a positive stance in only one percent of the coverage and a negative one in 21 percent of
the coverage.
H1b had to do with stance on bailouts. The hypothesis stated that Spanish
coverage would be most friendly and British coverage would be least, with German
coverage in the middle. The results did not support this hypothesis.
Table 4-6: Bailouts in the News
Country
Bailout Policy
Description
Recipient of bailout funds,
Spain
some stigma attached to
term “bailout”109
Refused to take part in
Britain
bailouts in the EU110
One of the larger lenders
Germany
in EU bailouts, insists on
attaching austerity
measures to terms of the
loans111

Average Bailout Stance in the
News*
1.97 (2=neutral)
(N with stance=71)
1.86 (N with stance=29)
1.62 (N with stance=45)

*Only of articles that had a stance toward bailouts. Those that did not show a stance were not included in
the calculation.

Based on the average stance of the articles that showed a stance toward bailouts in
Table 4-6, Spanish coverage was the friendliest toward bailouts. However, the Spanish
stance still was not positive. Perhaps this means the Spanish result represented a
combination of stigma toward and a need for bailouts. Spain’s average was slightly
below a neutral stance at 1.97. Germany’s average was closest to a negative skew,
although not drastically so, at 1.62. Britain’s average was in the middle at 1.86, which
did not reflect the animosity British politicians demonstrated towards bailouts. The
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overall neutrality toward bailouts was unexpected, although it could reflect a recognition
of the potential for bailouts to help countries with excessive debt.
The frequencies in Table 4-7 show that Spanish coverage was the least likely to
demonstrate a stance. German coverage was most likely to show stance, although the
differences were very small at only three percent. Spain had the most frequent positive
and least frequent negative stories of all three countries, with six percent negative
coverage and five percent positive. German coverage showed the inverse, with 13
percent negative coverage and two percent positive coverage. These results show the
opposing viewpoints on bailouts in Spain and Germany.
Table 4-7: Frequency of Bailout Stance (% of total rounded to nearest whole
percent)
Country
No Bailout
Negative
Neutral/Balanced Positive
Stance Shown
73%
6%
16%
5%
Spain
71%
7%
19%
3%
Britain
70%
13%
15%
2%
Germany
Total Number
365
43
82
20
of Articles in
Each Category
Culture in the News
H2 and H3 had to do with the effect of culture on news coverage. H2 dealt with
government support in the news. According to the previous research, Spanish coverage
should have shown the most government support, followed by Germany and Britain. The
United States was supposed to have the least government support. The results did not
support this hypothesis.
The German and British average stance toward national government in the news
was very close, although their order was the same as that in the hypothesis (see Table 48). However, the United States and Spain were the opposite of what the hypothesis
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stated. Spanish coverage was the least supportive, with an average of 1.84, while
American was the most, with an average of 2.29. The rather positive skew of American
content and almost neutral skew of Spanish content did not reflect the role perceptions
Hanitzsch found. The averages could have been affected by the subject matter of the
coverage. Spain was struggling while the United States was further removed from the
crisis, which could have affected the content about national government.
Table 4-8: Government Support in the News
Country
Culture- Government Support
Description
News considered most likely to be
United
“watchdog” of government112
States
Considered likely to be “watchdog”
Germany
of government but more supportive
than the American or British
models113
Considered likely to be “watchdog”
Britain
of government, some continental
European influences may make
more likely to be supportive114
Considered most likely to be
Spain
supportive of the government,
works closer with government than
other models115

Average Government Stance in
the News*
2.29 (2=neutral)
(N with stance=14)
1.94 (N with stance=17)

1.92 (N with stance=13)

1.84 (N with stance=50)

*Only of articles that had a stance toward the government. Those that did not show a stance were not
included in the calculation.

The frequencies of each stance show a similar trend in Table 4-9. The American
coverage had supportive stories most often, with five percent of the coverage being
supportive. American coverage also had the least frequent unsupportive stories of all of
the newspapers, with two percent of the coverage being unsupportive. Spanish coverage
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had the most frequent unsupportive stories at five percent while British coverage had the
least frequent stories in the supportive category at two percent. The American news was
least likely show a stance whereas the Spanish news was most likely.
Table 4-9: Frequency of Government Stance (% of total rounded to nearest whole
percent)
Country
No Government Not
Neutral/Balanced Supportive
Stance
Supportive
90%
2%
3%
5%
United States
87%
3%
8%
2%
Britain
89%
4%
4%
3%
Germany
81%
5%
12%
2%
Spain
Total Number
552
26
48
20
of Articles in
Each Category
H3 dealt with another measure of culture in the news, which was opinion.
Opinion in news was measured by whether a news article was on a news page or an
opinion page in the newspaper. Based on the results of previous studies, Spanish news
was supposed to have the most, followed by German and British. American coverage
should have had the least. The results did not support this hypothesis.
Table 4-10: Opinion in the News
Country
Culture- Opinion in News
Description
Expected to have less opinion116
Britain
Spain
United States
Germany

116

Expected to have the most opinion
in the news, news culture mixes
opinion and fact117
Expected to have the least
opinion118
Expected to have some opinion,
news culture values offering
multiple viewpoints119

Hallin and Mancini, Comparing Media Systems, 246.
Ibid., 246.
118
Ibid., 246.
117

Average Opinion in the News
1.25 (1=news page story,
2=opinion page story)
(N of opinion=25)
1.24 (N of opinion=62)
1.17 (N of opinion=23)
1.12 (N of opinion=18)
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The average of the opinion measure for each newspaper showed British coverage
had the largest skew toward opinion. The Spanish average closely followed the British
one, with an average of 1.24 and 1.25 respectively, as Table 4-10 shows. The difference
between Britain and Spain was not very big in this case. What was surprising was that
German coverage had the smallest skew toward opinion at 1.12. Even the results
showing the average number of characters in opinion pieces did not support the
hypothesis. Rather, it showed the inverse of the trend shown by the skew, as Table 4-11
shows. German news had the longest opinion pieces, followed by the American,
Spanish, and finally the British. The short British opinion pieces made sense because the
British articles were rather short overall. The others were also fairly close to the overall
average of articles shown in Table 4-1, although Germany had slightly longer opinion
pieces than the United States. That difference could be a reflection of a greater focus on
opinion in German news than in American news.
Table 4-11: Average Number of Characters in Opinion Pieces
Newspaper’s Country
Average Number of Characters
(w/Spaces)
United States
5,366
Britain
4,331
Germany
5,836
Spain
4,949
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Chapter 5: Discussion
The patterns and trends found in relation to the research questions and hypotheses
in some ways point to differences between countries and in other ways point to
similarities that previous research overlooked.
Amount of Coverage and Topic
It was not surprising that the Spanish and German samples had the most articles in
them because those two countries are deeply involved in the euro crisis. However, it was
a little surprising that the British sample had the least overall despite Britain being a part
of the European Union. A comparison of the amount of coverage in each time period
gave a possible explanation. The British and American newspapers had similar amounts
of coverage during the selected weeks in June 2011 and January/February 2012.
American coverage had 59 articles total during these periods while British coverage had
60. However, in the June 2012 and September 2012 selected weeks, British coverage
dropped to only 40 articles whereas American coverage produced 77 articles. Perhaps
British coverage decreased because Prime Minister David Cameron refused to take part
in the second Greek bailout in 2011. Cameron thus distanced Britain from the
Eurozone’s problems.
The distribution of topic categories was fairly similar in all four countries. The
similarities show that reality influenced topic choice more than other factors. Overall,
coverage focused extensively on bailouts, meetings, and the societal effects of the crisis,
showing that journalists in those countries considered those topics most important.
Differences in topic frequency pointed to what was specifically important in each
country. However, the differences pointed to the influence of reality, just more
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specifically the realities within each country. Meetings stories were slightly more
prominent in British news than in the others, perhaps because that was the extent to
British involvement in the crisis and trying to resolve it. Otherwise, business effects
stories were also more frequent in the British coverage than in the others, possibly also
showing how Britain’s business relations connected the country to the crisis.
The Spanish coverage also hinted at what was more important for Spain, which
the resistance and banking story frequencies showed. Those types of stories were
probably more prominent in Spanish coverage because of the protests and banking crisis
taking place in Spain at the time. However, quite often the stories in these categories
focused on similar happenings in other countries, like neighboring Portugal.
The German coverage had the most frequent bailout stories and the least frequent
austerity stories. Those statistics could probably stem from a concern that a bailout
would mean a loss for Germany. The country would have to pay more than others would
to countries that may not be able to pay back the loans. Austerity could also be old news
to the German journalists who probably wrote about it when Germany adopted them
before the crisis.
American coverage often included elements that would make the euro crisis more
interesting or relevant to the reader. Market effects, human interest, and historical
comparison stories were more frequent in American coverage than in the others. The
market effects stories always connected what was happening in Europe to stock market
volatility in New York. Journalists used information about events in Europe to explain
changes in the stock market. Historical comparison stories usually compared the euro
crisis to the recession in the United States in 2008. The comparison stories, like the
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market effects stories, made the United States a part of the story of Europe. When the
United States could not be a part of the story, human interest stories were probably a
more compelling way to present euro crisis information to people less affected by the
crisis than dry reports.
The handful of stories in the “unique topic” subcategory also pointed to some
difference in perspective in each country. The stories in the unique subcategory were
each one of a kind. The ones that stood out in this subcategory were particularly telling
of differences in perspective among the countries studied, especially in the German and
Spanish samples. For example, the German newspaper had a story about a survey of
Europeans about attitudes toward certain European nationalities.120 The article title was
“Europeans find the Germans to be the Hardest-Working.” Economic news seemed to
affect the results of the survey beyond the detail the headline included. The author also
related the results to what was happening in the euro crisis. The people who took the
survey considered Greeks, Italians, and Spaniards to be the laziest people in Europe.
These countries also happened to have economic difficulties during the crisis. The
survey indicated a widespread negative view of the Greeks, perhaps because of the two
bailouts Greece had received by the time the newspaper published the article. The results
showed a positive view of Germans, with mostly Greek respondents showing a dislike of
Germans. None of the other newspapers in this thesis wrote anything about the survey.
The positivity toward Germans and Germany probably made the survey newsworthy in
the German newspaper. “Suffering from Capitalism” was another unique story from the
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German newspaper.121 The story discussed the pros and cons of capitalism. The possible
role of capitalism in the euro crisis also came up in the discussion.
The unique stories that stood out in the Spanish coverage tended to show the
perspective of a bailout recipient in multiple ways. For example, while the headline
“Greece Pushes Europe to the Limit” might lead the reader to believe the story would
deal with the Greek bailout or austerity measures, the focus of the story took a different
approach. The article was about German Euroscepticism.122 The author explained
German Euroscepticism from a variety of angles, including German economic policy
trends and the government’s concern with pleasing the German public. Another article
dealt with federalism in Europe.123 Federalism has been subject to debate in Europe
because some countries want more of it in the EU while others want less. More
federalism in the EU would mean a division of power among a central political authority
for the entire EU and the individual member states. A push toward more federalism in
Europe would change the division of power, possibly to give more power to states that
did not have much say in the founding treaties of the EU, like Spain.
Austerity
The data supported the austerity hypothesis. The fact that the articles that had a
stance overall mirrored the national policies toward austerity showed that austerity policy
was influential in how newspapers covered austerity in those countries. However, the
majority of the articles in the sample had no stance toward austerity. Even though
austerity policies were a big part of economic politics in the crisis, austerity did not play
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as big of a role in coverage of the crisis as other parts of the crisis did. If austerity had
played a bigger role in coverage, more coverage would have had a stance.
The overall lack of stance raises questions about whether the Western notion of
objectivity had an effect on content in this case. Scholars and journalists have a hard
time defining what objective news is, although the accepted definition is typically
unbiased or balanced coverage.124 While the absence of stance toward a particular policy
or institution might indicate a certain balance in the presentation of that policy or
institution, lack of stance does not make the article objective. All actions involve choice.
Other aspects of the article could be imbalanced. Choosing which topics to cover and
how to cover them is subjective and involves bias.125 There is also inherent bias in
decisions of which facts and quotes are important enough to include.126 While the high
percentage of articles without a stance could indicate the journalists tried to remain
objective by balancing viewpoints, the choices they made could never be objective. The
coverage they produced could also never be objective.
Even though most articles did not show any stance toward austerity, the sample
did show some differences in perspective. The tension between German austerity
backers and Spanish politicians trying to avoid more imposed austerity measures brought
about a few interesting examples.
The stories in the Frankfurter Allgemeine that were positive toward austerity took
a variety of forms. Some went into the background of German austerity to prove a point.

124

Stephen J. Berry, “Why Objectivity Still Matters,” Nieman Reports (Summer 2005), accessed April 12,
2014, http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/101090/Why-Objectivity-Still-Matters.aspx
125
John H. McManus, “Objectivity: It’s Time to Say Goodbye,” Nieman Reports (Summer 2009), accessed
April 12, 2014 http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/101564/Objectivity-Its-Time-to-SayGoodbye.aspx
126
Ibid.

53

For example, in an article titled “Europe’s Iron Lady,” the author points out that German
austerity reforms before Chancellor Angela Merkel took office in 2005 were
controversial at first. However, the reforms worked well after a few years, which is why
Germany is in a good position economically. The author pointed out that similar
measures could work in other countries too, although austerity would look different in
each place because all situations are different.127 Despite taking some time to work,
austerity measures had a positive influence on the German economy. Other stories
focused on other countries. Sometimes they would focus on austerity measures going
into effect in other countries, highlighting the resilience of those governments in trying to
reach economic goals. The article “Portugal Raises Taxes” focused on such resilience.
The coverage praised Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho because his
austerity and consolidation programs made him the “model student” among the indebted
Mediterranean countries.128 Unlike other leaders of indebted countries, he kept moving
forward in austerity, even when the public objected. In other cases, the coverage blamed
problems on governments not following austerity plans as they promised they would.129
Had the governments followed the austerity plans, problems would not have arisen.
Spanish coverage used different expert opinions and focused on different facts
from the German coverage when handling austerity, all of which painted a different
picture. Sometimes the statements about austerity were simple. For example, the
“sacred” austerity became too expensive,130 did not produce desirable results as other
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measures would,131 and failed to help any country in the Eurozone reduce structural
deficits.132 Other articles were more colorful in descriptions of the dangers of austerity.
One pointed to the cuts and reforms as not only harming the credibility of the euro, but
also as part of an inadequate response to recession in the southern countries.133 Another
pointed to nepotism and corruption among politicians as a reason for austerity not
working.134
Perhaps the strongest arguments made against austerity in Spanish coverage were
comparative in nature. One piece equated what was happening in Greece, presumably
because of austerity measures, to the negative effects in Germany after the Treaty of
Versailles that led to political upheaval and contributed to the rise in extremism.135
Another piece about Greece quoted a Greek politician as saying that those asking Greece
to increase austerity and privatization are asking that he “support a medicine for someone
who is dying because of that very medicine.”136 Both examples show very strong
aversion to austerity measures and their effects. The comparison to the Treaty of
Versailles is very strong because many researchers consider the treaty part of what
contributed to the rise of Nazism in Germany. The other comparison is strong because it
means austerity is killing the Greek economy instead of helping it.
Coding included American stance toward austerity despite American stance not
being a part of the hypothesis. Even though Spain was the one fearing the imposition of
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austerity measures, American news coverage had the least favorable skew toward
austerity. Perhaps this came from American politics using a different vocabulary to
describe austerity. Alternatively, maybe the higher frequency of human interest stories in
American coverage influenced the measurements. The human interest stories often
showed the personal effects of governmental austerity in Europe, none of which were
positive.
Bailouts
The data did not support the hypothesis on bailout stance. Even though the
British refused to take part in bailouts in the EU while Germany, although maybe
begrudgingly, took part in them, British news favored bailouts more than German news
did. In this case, the policy of no international bailouts did not affect news coverage. It
was as if bailouts in Europe were fine, just as long as Britain did not have to be a part of
them.
Even though bailout stories were the most frequent of any topic, the majority of
articles did not have a stance toward bailouts. As with austerity policy, this lack of stance
could show that while bailouts were a major part of how the EU dealt with the crisis
showing a stance on bailouts was not as important as just reporting on them. However,
there was some interesting tension in how each newspaper presented its stances.
The German coverage was slightly more negative than the other coverage. The
coverage showed its stance through the opinions it chose to include as well as the factual
details about bailouts it focused on. Quite often, the possible effects in Germany of
bailouts in other countries became the focus. For instance, some articles pointed out that
bailouts to other Eurozone countries could affect inflation levels within Germany. An
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increase in inflation would negatively affect everyone’s finances, especially “the savers,
the retired, and the poor.”137 Articles also presented Eurobonds, a possible way for the
European Central Bank to aid the indebted countries, as negative for Germany. One
article included the quote “Eurobonds would drive Germany to ruin.”138 Even though
Germany took part in aid to others, the thought of too much aid created negativity in the
coverage.
Other articles that focused on the negative side of bailouts dealt with how they
were ineffective in the countries that had taken them. In terms of Greece, the German
coverage would often compare the country’s need for aid as a “bottomless pit.” In one
such case, the author called the economic reality politically taboo and criticized Brussels
for offering Greece more aid after Greece failed to adhere to the austerity terms of
previous aid.139 Another article went so far as to say that the Greek rescue package was
not good for anyone.140 The German coverage criticized the bailout in Spain less,
although the coverage was still not positive. One article that covered the bailout as not
working focused on the bailout bringing the Spanish government’s debt to “critical”
levels rather than helping the banks there.141 In general, many stories that focused on
bailouts not working focused on the costs of the bailouts, not only for Germany, but also
for other countries.
The politics of bailouts also became the focus of a few stories with less than
favorable stances on bailouts. One story focused on the pressure on Germany to bail out
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the weaker economies in the Eurozone, saying that “Germany does not have unending
strength.” The story went on to say that those who expected Germany to be able to fix
everything were living in a “fairytale.”142 Others complained of indebted countries not
wanting to deal with the consequences of their bailouts. One article addressed the
complaints from indebted countries that austerity terms to the loans infringed on their
sovereignty by pointing out the other side of sovereignty: being willing to fail alone.143
Essentially the author was saying that if the indebted governments want help from other
countries to get out of debt, they have to deal with the repercussions. The indebted
countries cannot expect sovereignty and outside help at the same time. There had to be a
trade-off. Another piece criticized the Spanish bailout because it had better terms than
the Greek, Irish, and Portuguese bailouts. The author called the Spanish rescue a bailout
“without political costs” because “the rescuers may only watch” while “the debtors
dictate the rules.”144 The article had the same stance as the previous one, that the
recipients of the bailouts are not the ones who should be dictating the terms. If the
debtors can dictate the terms, then they can take advantage of the countries that better
managed their economies.
Spanish coverage showed aspects of the other side of bailouts. One way coverage
did that was to emphasize a need for bailouts because of possible positive economic
effects. One such article said that austerity policies alone could not fix anything and that
growth and stimulus policies would fix the economy.145 When there was speculation that
the Spanish government would request financial help from the EU, an article with a
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positive stance covered the Spanish stock market doing the best it had all year. The
author attributed the improved performance to the speculation of a bank bailout.146 Other
articles that focused on the good side of the bailout pointed out the need for one in Spain.
The opinions came from European experts147 as well as the American president, Barack
Obama, when he was campaigning for reelection.148
Another way Spanish coverage focused on the positive side of bailouts was to
praise the European decision to offer one to Spain. The coverage also praised the better
terms Spain managed to get on the loan. Before European leaders formally agreed upon
the bailout, one article highlighted Germany’s willingness to give Spain better terms than
other indebted countries. However, at that point it was still uncertain whether Spain
would actually take a bailout.149 Even after Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy
formally asked for help, coverage praised the terms of the loan, saying they were “very
favorable for stability.”150 Another article welcomed the bailout, saying, “Spain will
finally be rescued.”151 Yet another used the supportive opinion of the bailout from an
expert from Citi, who said, “The Eurogroup agreement is very positive. It is more than a
bailout; it is an umbrella. They have given coverage to Spain and, incidentally, have
created a new mechanism considering other countries with similar problems. They have
sent a message of greater European financial integration to the market.”152 According to

146

J.S. González, “El Ibex 35 cierra la mejor semana del año al subir el 8,03%,” El País, June 9, 2012, 24.
Ángel Laborda, “Algo se mueve en Europa,” El País, September 16, 2012, 22.
148
Antonio Caño, “Obama pone su reelección en manos de la UE,” El País, June 9, 2012, 3.
149
Juan Gómez and Luis Doncel, “Alemania plantea rescatar a España con condiciones más suaves a través
del FROB,” El País, June 7, 2012, 21.
150
Amanda Mars, “Guindos: ‘Esto es un préstamo en condiciones muy ventajosas,” El País, June 10, 2012,
30.
151
Claudi Pérez and Luis Doncel, “Rescate a España,” El País, June 10, 2012, 1.
152
David Fernández, “España gana una batalla al mercado, pero la Guerra sigue,” El País, June 11, 2012,
27.
147

59

the Spanish coverage, a bailout could only have positive effects on Spain and the
markets.
Most of the coverage in The Times had a neutral stance toward bailouts.
However, the coverage about bailouts and meetings deciding on bailouts was often quite
critical of the leaders involved in them. Both Greece and Germany became the focus of
criticism because of the roles each country played in bailouts.
In the case of Greece, the coverage related to the bailout typically called for
Greece to leave the euro before bringing the entire Eurozone down with it.153 Sometimes
coverage went so far as to say the damage Greece had already done could not be
undone.154 However, even though Greece was not running its economy properly with the
help it had already received, Greece was not to blame, according to the British coverage
at least. Germany was at fault for not wanting to help more. Coverage went into how
Cameron lectured Merkel about European trade imbalances creating more need for
economic aid,155 as well as other ways the Germans have been unfair. One article from
the time of the second Greek bailout complained of how the Germans refused to accept
blame for the situation in Greece. According to the article, the Germans should have
known they would have to support other weaker countries.156 Later on, during the global
economic meeting in Davos, Merkel was the target of criticism. When focusing on the
meeting itself, the author described Merkel’s speech as “lackluster” and noted that the
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“anger directed at Germany was particularly fervent,”157 a detail not included in the
Davos coverage in the other newspapers. When dealing with the content of what Merkel
said about bailouts, another article said that Merkel “embarrassed everybody” with her
idea for more oversight in countries receiving bailouts. After a discussion of everything
wrong with the situation, the author concluded, “Germany is willing to ‘do whatever it
takes’ to save the euro, apart from any of the things that would actually work.”158 The
views in The Times coverage of countries involved in bailouts ranged from blaming
countries that needed bailouts for the problems in Europe to blaming the countries bailing
out the weaker countries for the problems in Europe.
American stance toward bailout would have been the most favorable had it been
part of the hypothesis. Maybe this has something to do with the bailouts and stimulus the
American government did years before. It could have also had something to do with
Obama pushing growth policies in Europe to improve the global economy.
Government Support
The results failed to support the government support hypothesis. The lack of
support for this hypothesis shows that the assumption that attitudes can predict content is
not correct, at least in this case. This is in line with part of the findings of Van Dalen et
al.159 Here, the role perceptions journalists reported concerning national government
support had no bearing on the stances demonstrated in the content. That means that
journalists’ attitudes do not necessarily have an effect on content.
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The results placed German and British news in the hypothesized positions in the
ranking, which supported the findings by Hallin and Mancini in 2004. However, the
American and Spanish newspapers were the opposite. Spanish news was the least
supportive of its government while American news was the most supportive. In this
situation, the results did not support findings of Hallin and Mancini. Maybe it was
because of the specific subject matter and time periods. During these time periods, Spain
elected a new leader, Mariano Rajoy, who broke many promises. Part of his campaign
was his promise to avoid a bailout from the EU. A lot of coverage complained of Rajoy
changing his mind about needing a bailout, not calling the Spanish bailout a bailout, and
not understanding what was happening in his own country.
Quite a few of the stories that had a negative stance toward the government aimed
negativity directly at Rajoy. The criticism started already in January 2012, when the EU
leaders had summits to attend and were visiting with other leaders. One article criticized
Rajoy for always “trying to confuse,” pointing out that he would say one thing about
austerity in a speech in Lisbon and then another thing about austerity in Berlin.160 The
complaints about Rajoy changed in June 2012, when Spain was getting a bailout. The
journalists did not seem happy with Spain getting a bailout. One article said that Rajoy
did not really think the decision through and was “absent during the first moments of the
rescue.”161 Another around the same time overflowed with negative opinions about
Rajoy. His resistance to calling the bank rescue what it was, a rescue, “has undermined
his image and that of Spain.” The euphemisms caused other European leaders to lose
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confidence in Rajoy because they did not understand “if the sale of ‘not-a-rescue’ was
marketing or inability to comprehend reality.”162 The article also contained a quote from
a writer for La Repubblica, Francesca Caferri, along similar lines: “There is also a big
surprise with Rajoy. It seems he does not know where he is going. His changes in
course, that help is not needed, that now yes, but it is not called a rescue, generate
confusion and lack of confidence. He is either a liar or does not know what he is
doing.”163 Later on, in September, coverage accused Rajoy of being too partisan.164
Other Spanish journalists blamed the government in general rather than directly
criticizing Rajoy. The authors criticized the government for not making the right reforms
to make bank improvements easier165 and preventing austerity measures from working.166
Another piece accused politicians of being out of touch and paid too much.167
As for the United States, the unexpected support could be because the country
was not a part of the euro crisis. International coverage is different from domestic
coverage. The stories in the sample that had a stance toward the American government
generally pointed out what worked for the United States in the 2008 recession or during
other times of economic difficulty as responsible government action. For example,
articles from around the time of the Spanish bailout decision highlighted why that
decision was a bad one while the similar decisions made in the United States years before
were smarter. One hinted that the Europeans did not follow the American example
correctly, calling the individual bailouts that have been used as needed in Europe “a
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fool’s errand.”168 The Europeans were not following the American example well because
they would not increase the government-backed account limit. The increase in the
account limit was the “unsung hero of ending the crisis” in the United States, not just the
stimulus. In another example of Europe not following the American example correctly,
the author praised former president George W. Bush’s strategy in dealing with banks that
were too big to fail. However, Europe’s approach in dealing with Spain, which is also
too big to fail for the EU, the author wrote off as not the way to go. The author wondered
why Germany did not take similar measures to those the American government did.169
Going farther back in history, another piece from around the same time praised the
Marshall Plan that the American government put into place after World War II. The
main argument was that Germany needed to have the “same sense of urgency and vision
that America did after World War II with the Marshall Plan, a farsighted program of
assistance for the reconstruction of Europe.”170 The plan Germany already had, the
author said, could be a threat to democracy.
Even in covering American involvement in the euro crisis, the coverage that had a
stance on the American government painted the picture of the United States as a leader
with the best ways to handle problems. A piece about an American financial diplomat
emphasized the American involvement in fixing the euro issues. At one point, the article
stated, “At times, the Treasury Department’s presence has proved crucial in moving
Europe back from the brink.”171 This article and the ones previously explained all made a
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point of placing the American government in the global leadership role rather than just
another piece in the global political and economic puzzle.
Opinion
The data did not support the opinion hypothesis. Britain had the most stories on
opinion pages while Germany had the least, which was unexpected. German news had
the longest opinion pieces while British news had the shortest ones. This discrepancy
with the previous research could be because the coding considered only whether the
articles were on an opinion page or filed as an opinion piece on the database or website.
Coding for that rather than the more subjective decision of whether a piece was an
opinion piece perhaps worked better for the American and British coverage. The
previous research about media models show there is greater separation between news and
opinion in American and British news.172 There were examples in the German and
Spanish samples that read somewhat like opinion pieces but were not filed as opinion
pieces or editorials. Those stories were coded as news because of how the newspapers
filed them. Different coding could have increased the number of opinion pieces in both
the Spanish and German samples. Such an increase could have produced a ranking more
similar to that in previous research. In addition, it could be possible that opinion pieces
that appeared in print versions of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung did not make it to
the website and therefore would not have shown up in the sample.
Regardless of whether the British news was truly more opinionated than the
others were or if that were only so in the coding scheme used, British editorials showed
the Euroscepticism found in previous research.173 Beyond just doubtfulness of
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Europeans’ ability to take care of their own problems, some stories criticized European
integration in general. Quite often, the point was that Britain was lucky to be separate
from the Eurozone because of all of the debt problems there.174 Others covered a
possible referendum that anti-Europeans proposed in Britain to determine whether the
country should integrate more or less with Europe. One piece argued that Britain was not
part of Europe and never will be.175 Another presented European integration as flawed
and a source of division in Europe.176 Yet another said that the British public revered the
monarchy more than the European Council. The same article blamed German economic
policy both before the euro and during the crisis for the possible referendum in Britain.177
Even though the results for the hypotheses did not show as much of a relationship
between culture and news coverage as previous research did, other indicators hinted at
some influence from culture. For example, of the articles with a stance on austerity,
bailouts, or government, Spanish news was overall more likely than the others to have a
stance, which would support the higher tendency to be partisan in Spanish press.178
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
The results supported one out of four hypotheses. The lack of support for the
bailout hypothesis could stem from the British wanting bailouts in Europe that do not
involve Britain. The coverage showed a simultaneous push for Germany to pay for
weaker Eurozone countries and desire for Britain to stay insulated from Europe’s
problems. Policy could only reflect the desire for insulation.
The lack of support for the culture hypotheses could come down to methodology.
Previous research that used surveys of journalists and general impressions of journalism
to find cultural differences provided the basis for the culture hypotheses. The differences
the previous research found were not necessarily differences that would appear in
content. Van Dalen et al. found that the attitudes journalists present in surveys do not
always match the patterns in content.179 General impressions of cultural differences in
the media systems in Hallin and Mancini’s 2004 study might also not show themselves in
content, especially if media systems are becoming more similar.180 This means that
cultural differences as shown in surveys and qualitative studies may not show up in
quantitative studies of content. In this case, content did not reflect the attitudes of
journalists. The assumption that attitudes affect content is not true, at least in this
context. The best way to understand news content is to measure it directly.
While the results did not show as much difference as expected in the hypotheses,
the results still have other implications. The lack of difference in some areas could mean
that news content is becoming more similar in different countries instead of maintaining
differences. However, the difference that was there could also have some meaning.
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Newspapers in different countries will not necessarily cover the same events in the same
way. Point of view, which politics and culture can influence, has an effect on coverage.
In this case, economic policy had more influence on how newspapers covered the euro
crisis in a given country than the culture or journalistic attitudes of that country did.
Policy could also have a greater influence than culture for other topics in economic
coverage.
Outside of the news, the wider implications for Europe could be that true unity is
a ways away. As the Spanish article comparing austerity to the terms of the Treaty of
Versailles pointed out, more extreme politics may lie ahead.181 Right-leaning and farright parties that are against a united Europe have already been gaining popularity
throughout the continent. Many left-leaning and far-left parties are also against a united
Europe. Beyond political parties, the secondary research already showed different views
on European policy within the EU. The results from this thesis demonstrate that the news
shows some differences as well. Not only were the opinions about policy different, but at
times so were the facts the journalists selected. German coverage could focus on the
positive side of austerity, using facts about reduction of national deficits, while a Spanish
story could focus on the negative side of austerity, like lack of funds for social welfare or
aid to poorer countries. Both are using facts about austerity but still manage to show a
stance without using opinions. The presentation of different facts to people and policy
makers in different countries could be problematic if more unity is Europe’s goal.
A lot could be learned from these results, but this study still had limitations. Two
measures for policy and two measures for culture in the news offer some information, but
more could have made the results clearer. Tweaking some of the coding about opinion,
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despite the possibility of making it more subjective, could also have made the results
better, although running the risk of being less reliable. Closer examination of the
adjectives used to describe austerity, bailouts, and government could have also given
stance measures another dimension. Having access to the print version of the German
newspaper through the same database as the others would have ensured every article that
appeared in the print version of the paper would have appeared in the sample, not just the
ones that also ended up on the website. Perhaps future research could expand the coding
scheme to include more policy and culture measures, more time periods, and more
newspapers to get a fuller picture of what is happening in the EU. Such a study could
represent more countries and more viewpoints within the countries.
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Appendix: News Content Coding Sheet
Coding Sheet Number:____
NEWSPAPER 1=El País, 2=The Times, 3=Frankfurter Allgemeine, 4=NYT_______
DATE

Date of the article (ex 0613 for June 13)…………………………_______

LENGTH Length of the article (in characters including spaces)…………....._______
TOPIC

1=human interest, 2=austerity, 3=bailouts, 4=currency values…..._______
5=meetings, 6=resistance, 7=general effects, 8=miscellaneous

OPINION 1=News page coverage, 2=Opinion page piece…………………..._______
AUSTERITY What view of austerity did the item convey? 0=it didn’t deal with
or focus on austerity, 1=negative, 2= neutral/balanced, 3=positive_______
BAILOUTS What view of bailouts for struggling countries did the item convey?
0= it didn’t deal with or focus on loans, 1=negative, 2=neutral/
balanced, 3=positive…………………………………………………...._______

